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The Amended Google Books Settlement Is Still Exclusive
James Grimmelmann1  
  

I. INTRODUCTION
The deal that Google would get under the proposed amended settlement in the Authors Guild case is
exclusive in one very important sense. Many out-of-print books are so-FDOOHG ´RUSKDQZRUNVµ WKH\·UH LQ
FRS\ULJKWEXWWKHLUFRS\ULJKWRZQHUVFDQ·WEHIRXQG,I\RXRU,VWDUWSULQWLQJQHZFRSLHVRIWKHVHERRNV
ZH·GEHFRS\ULJKWLQIULQJHUVVXEMHFt to statutory damages of up to $150,000 a book³or even jail time.
*RRJOH RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG ZLOO EH DXWKRUL]HG WR VHOO RQOLQH FRSLHV RI WKHVH ERRNV 7KDW·V H[FOXVLYLW\
permission to do what is forbidden to others.
Some pro-settlement commentators have challenged this view. They believe that the market for
electronic editions of orphan books is RSHQWR*RRJOH·VFRPSHWLWRUV2 They make three principal claims:
first, that the settlement creates no new entry barriers; second, that it explicitly enables the new Book
Rights Registry to issue licenses to competitors; and third, that competitors could reasonably expect to
obtain class-DFWLRQVHWWOHPHQWVVXEVWDQWLDOO\LGHQWLFDOWR*RRJOH·V$OOWKUHHRIWKHVHSURSRVLWLRQVDUHZURQJ
In this essay, I will explain why.
II. COMPARATIVE ENTRY BARRIERS ARE HIGHER AFTER THE SETTLEMENT THAN BEFORE
6HWWOHPHQW SURSRQHQWV W\SLFDOO\ VWDUW ZLWK WKH DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH VHWWOHPHQW LV ´QRQH[FOXVLYHµ
EHFDXVHLWGRHVQ·WSURKLELWFRS\ULJKWRZQHUVIURPGHDOLQJZLWK*RRJOH·VFRPSHWLWRUs. That might be a fair
characterization if this were merely a private contract for widgetium (the crucial mineral input to
widgets)³but copyrights are different.
The Copyright Act deals in exclusive rights. No one besides the copyright owner is allowed to
KDQGRXWOLFHQVHV,IWKLVZHUHZLGJHWLXP*RRJOH·VFRPSHWLWRUVFRXOGGHDOZLWKDOWHUQDWLYHVXSSOLHUVEXW
HDFKFRS\ULJKWLVLWVRZQPLQLDWXUHPRQRSRO\,W·VDWRUWDQGDFULPHWRVHOOFRSLHVRIDERRNZLWKRXWWKH
FRS\ULJKWRZQHU·VSHUPLVVLRQ7KDWPDWWHrs because many of those copyright owners have gone AWOL.
7KHVHDUHWKHRUSKDQRZQHUVZKRFDQ·WEHIRXQG7KHUHDUHDORWRIWKHPWRRHVWLPDWHVDUHWKDWWKHUHDUH
hundreds of thousands of orphan books.3 Since only the owner can grant permission and thesHRZQHUVFDQ·W
be found, there is no feasible, legal way for a Google competitor to sell copies of these books. 4
*RRJOHKRZHYHUGLGQ·WDFWXDOO\WUDFNGRZQWKHVHRUSKDQRZQHUV$VDFODVVDFWLRQWKHVHWWOHPHQW
rests on the fiction that the class members FRQVHQW WR *RRJOH·V IXWXUH DFWLRQV )RU RUSKDQ RZQHUV WKH
1
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See Mark Lemley, An Antitrust Assessment of the Google Book Search Settlement; David Balto, The Earth is Not Flat: The Public
Interest and the Google Book Search Settlement: A Reply to Grimmelmann, ACSBLOG, Jul. 22, 2009,
http://www.acslaw.org/node/13812; Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan
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http://personanondata.blogspot.com/2009/09/580388-orphan-works-give-or-take.html (Sept. 9, 2009).
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ILFWLRQLVDWUDQVSDUHQWOLH*RRJOH·VPDUNHWSODFHDGYDQWDJHIRURUSKDQERRNVZRXOGFRPHIURPWKHVWURNH
RI D 'LVWULFW -XGJH·V SHQ QRW IURP ´VXSHULRU SURGXFW EXVLQHVV DFXPHQ RU KLVWRULF DFFLGHQWµ5 *RRJOH·V
legal advantage over its competitors is thus not external to the settlement, but inherent in it. Selectively
lowering legal barriers for Google should receive as much scrutiny as selectively raising them for its
competitors.
III. THE SETTLEMENT DOES NOT LICENSE COMPETITORS
Next, settlement advocates have argued that the settlement itself can provide a hypothetical Google
competitor³OHW·V FDOO LW ´7ZR-JOHµ³the copyright licenses it would need. At every turn, however, the
settlement deliberately avoids such an arrangement.
The settlement is explicit that the only parties who directly receive licenses of any sort are Google
(to scan books6 and sell access7) and its partner libraries.8 No one else is licensed by the settlement to do
anything³QRW WKH XVHUV RI *RRJOH·V QHZ VHUYLFHV QRW HYHQ WKH 5HJLVWU\ 6LPLODUO\ RQO\ *RRJOH DQG LWV
partner libraries are released from liability for their actions pursuant to the settlement. 9 Likewise, the
settlement explicitly refuses to transfer any copyrights from orphan owners to entities potentially more
willing to issue licenses.10
One tantalizingly obscure passage in the settlement has misled some of its academic proponents:
The Registry will be organized on a basis that allows the Registry, among other things, to
WRWKHH[WHQWSHUPLWWHGE\ODZOLFHQVH5LJKWVKROGHUV·86FRS\ULJKWVWRWKLUGSDUWLHV
(in the case of unclaimed Books and Inserts, the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary may license to
third parties the Copyright11 Interests of Rightsholders of unclaimed Books and Inserts to the
extent permitted by law).
This passage is not a grant of power to the Registry or the UWF; it is a description of what the
5HJLVWU\·V FRUSRUDWH FKDUWHU ZLOO ´DOORZ>@µ Lt to do. I could charter a company tomorrow to trade in
widgetium, but its charter alone would give itno property rights to any actual widgetium.
1RU GRHV WKH SKUDVH ´WR WKH H[WHQW SHUPLWWHG E\ ODZµ JLYH WKH 5HJLVWU\ DQG 8:) WKH SRZHU WR
hand out licenses. These are words of limitation, not of empowerment; they prevent the Registry from
DFWLQJLOOHJDOO\7KHQRWLFHVHQWWRFODVVPHPEHUVVWDWHVWKDWLIWKH5HJLVWU\´UHSUHVHQWVWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKH
5LJKWVKROGHUVµLQ´FRPPHUFLDODUUDQJHPHQWVµZLWK´FRPSDQLHVRWKHUWKDQ*RRJOHµLWZLOOEH´VXEMHFWWRWKH
H[SUHVVDSSURYDORIWKH5LJKWVKROGHUVRIWKH%RRNVLQYROYHGµ12 7KHUH·VQRZD\WRVTXDUHWKDWGHVFULSWLRQ
with a settlement that authorizes the Registry to issue licenses for unclaimed works. Thus, on Day One, the
5HJLVWU\DQG8:)ZRQ·WEHDEOHLVVXHOLFHQVHVWR7ZR-JOHEHFDXVHWKH\·OOKDYHQRWKLQJWRJLYH
The Registry and UWF could eventually become licensing agents, but not under circumstances that
will be much consolation to Two-gle. The Registry can act on behalf of the owners of claimed works (with
WKHLU´H[SUHVVDSSURYDOµ ,13EXWWKDWZRQ·WKHOS7ZR-gle obtain a license to unclaimed orphan works. As for
5

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
Amended Settlement § 3.1(a)
7
Amended Settlement § 2.2
8
Amended Settlement § 7.1 (giving libraries a right to enter into standardized agreements with the Registry); attachments
B-1, B-2, & B-3 (specifying form of these agreements). Sections 2(a) of attachments B-1 and B-2 are the operative licenses. The
VHWWOHPHQWDQG*RRJOH·VVFDQQLQJDJUHHPHQWVSXWVWULFWOLPLWVRQKRZOLEUDULHVPD\XVHWKHLUGLJLWDOFRpies.
9
Amended Settlement § 10.2(a).
10
Amended Settlement § 3.1(a).
11
Amended Settlement § 6.2(b)(i).
12
Notice of Class Action Settlement 10.
13
Amended Settlement § 2.4.
6
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the UWF, the intent here is that if Congress wanted to allow third-party licenses for unclaimed works, the
UWF would be ready to play that role. As the New York Times explained, paraphrasing settlement architect
5LFKDUG 6DUQRII ´7KH >8:)@ with Congressional approval, can grant licenses to other companies who also
ZDQW WR VHOO WKHVH ERRNVµ 14 (emphasis added). This argument³that the settlement might be useful to
Congress³proves both too much and too little. On the one hand, if the settlement will be defective
ZLWKRXW&RQJUHVVLRQDODFWLRQWKHQ&RQJUHVV·VSDVWLQDFWLRQLVDSRRUDUJXPHQWIRUGRLQJWKLVGHDOMXGLcially
UDWKHUWKDQOHJLVODWLYHO\2QWKHRWKHU&RQJUHVVKDUGO\QHHGVWKHVHWWOHPHQW·VDVVLVWDQFHWRcreatean orphan
works fiduciary capable of granting licenses to others; it could just create one from scratch.
'RQ·WMXVWWDNHP\ZRUGIRULWWKDWWKHVHWWOHPHQWGRHVQ·WHPSRZHUWKH5HJLVWU\WRLVVXHRUSKDQ
ZRUNVOLFHQVHV$VNLWVGUDIWHUV7KH\´UHSUHVHQWHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKDWWKH\EHOLHYHWKH5HJLVWU\ZRXOG
lack the power and ability to license copyrighted books without the consent of the copyright oZQHUµ15 If
WKH\IXQGDPHQWDOO\PLVXQGHUVWRRGWKHLURZQVHWWOHPHQW·VOHJDOHIIHFWVRUOLHGWRWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFH
about them, they have bigger problems than whether the settlement is approved or not.
Professor Elhauge argues that if the Registry cannot legally license third parties even though it can
DFW ´WR WKH H[WHQW SHUPLWWHG E\ ODZµ WKHQ WKH SDUWLHV KDYH ´GRQH DOO >WKH\@ OHJDOO\ FRXOGµ 16 to promote
nonexclusivity. ThisDUJXPHQWUHVWVRQDQHTXLYRFDWLRQ$VXVHGLQWKHVHWWOHPHQW´WRWKHH[WHQWSHUPLtted
E\ODZµPHDQVWKDWRQFHWKHVWUXFWXUHVHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKHVHWWOHPHQWDUHLQSODFHWKH5HJLVWU\DQG8:)
may do anything legally permissible to issue licenses. As Elhauge uses the phrase, it refers instead to what
would have been legally permissible for the parties to have included in a hypothetical, more expansive class
DFWLRQ VHWWOHPHQW 7KHVH DUHQ·W WKH VDPH 3HUKDSV WUXH QRQH[FOXVLYLW\ ZRXOG EH LPSRVVLEOH XQGHU 5XOH
23³EXWWKHSDUWLHVKDYHQ·WDWWHPSWHGWRILQGRXW
IV. GOOGLE COMPETITORS CANNOT EASILY OBTAIN THEIR OWN CLASS-ACTION
SETTLEMENTS
Settlement proponents have also argued that Google competitors could obtain their own classDFWLRQVHWWOHPHQWVRQWKHVDPHWHUPVDV*RRJOH·V,W·VSRVVLEOHWKDWOLJKWQLQJFRXOGVWULNHWZLFH$IWHUDOO
who could have predicted the Authors Guild settlement? But a Two-gle settlement would be harder to
negotiate and harder to win approval for.
The Authors Guild settlement depends on choices made by copyright owners. The plaintiffs chose to
VXHWRVWRS*RRJOH·VVFDQQing, chose to sue in a broad class action, chose to settle rather than go to trial,
and chose to settle on terms that authorized selling full books. Take away even one of these freely made
FKRLFHVDQGWKHUHZRXOGKDYHEHHQQR´JURXQGEUHDNLQJVHWWOHPHQWµ
Two-JOHFRXOGQ·WUHSOLFDWHWKHAuthors Guild settlement without the active cooperation of authors
and publishers. Just imagine the legal gyrations it would take to obtain a settlement over their objections.
To get the case into court, Two-gle would need to bring a declaratory judgment action³and even that
ZRXOG UHTXLUH FRS\ULJKW RZQHUV WR ´FRRSHUDWHµ E\ PDNLQJ RPLQRXV HQRXJK QRLVHV WR PDNH WKH FDVH
justiciable. Turning it into a class action is even harder, because in a declaratory judgment action, it would
be a defendant-side class, which raises thorny civil procedure issues. (Who, for example, would serve as
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHIHQGDQWVRUSD\IRUWKHLUODZ\HUV" $QGZKHQLWFRPHVWLPHWRWDONVHWWOHPHQWWKHUH·VQR
way to guarantee Two-gle that the copyright owners would settle³let alone on specified terms³without
fatally undermining the freedom to make litigation decisions on which the adversary system depends. TwoJOH·VRQO\SODXVLEOHOLWLJDWLRQVWUDWHJ\ZRXOGEHWRFURVVLWVILQJHUVDQGSUD\
14

Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, Terms of Digital Book Deal With Google Revised, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at B2.
Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Class Settlement (filed Sept. 18, 2009).
16
Id. at 11.
15
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Professor Elhauge argues,
Rivals could simply engage in copying efforts similar to Google . . . . If no class action were
brought against the copying rivals, then the rivals would be even better off because they
would be able to offer the same books as Google without incurring the same royalty costs.
%XW WKDW FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ RYHUORRNV WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ *RRJOH·V SUH- and post-settlement
DFWLYLWLHV 6R IDU *RRJOH KDV RQO\ VFDQQHG ERRNV LQGH[HG WKHP DQG GLVSOD\HG VKRUW ´VQLSSHWVµ RI WKHLU
contents³a far cry from selling whole books. If Two-JOHPHUHO\VFDQQHGDQGLQGH[HGERRNVLWZRXOGQ·W
DFWXDOO\EHFRPSHWLQJZLWK*RRJOH·VSRVW-settlement programs. In order to compete in that market without
benefit of class-action settlement, Two-gle would need to actually sell books³thereby exposing itself to
much more severe copyright risks than Google has ever had to face.
Some pro-settlement commentators, recognizing that the important choices are out of Two-JOH·V
hands, have argued that copyright owners would be eager to setWOHRQVLPLODUWHUPV,·PQRWVRVXUH7KH
5HJLVWU\·V SDUHQWV DW WKH $XWKRUV *XLOG DQG $VVRFLDWLRQ RI $PHULFDQ 3XEOLVKHUV FRXOG ZHOO IHDU WKDW D
second settlement would cause Google and Two-gle to drive retail prices down as they compete with each
other for market share. On the other hand, if a different group of plaintiffs wanted to settle with Two-gle in
order to compete with the existing Registry, we can expect the Registry and its allies to fight back. The
result would be a race to the courthouse and a bitter struggle over class certification, negotiating authority,
and control over the litigation. The Authors Guild settlement, as bitterly contested as it has been, managed to
avoid some of this intra-class warfare because the plaintiffs stole a march on other copyright owners when
they negotiated in secret for years and presented the results as a fait accompli.
This leads us into the challenges Two-gle would face in winning approval for an already negotiated
settlement. Of course, it would inherit all of the procedural challenges facing the current settlement: the
FRXUW·V DUJXDEOH ODFN RI $UWLFOH ,,, DQG SHUVRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU PDQ\ FODVV PHPEHUV WKH
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVV RI WKH QDPHG SODLQWLIIV DQG WKH VHWWOHPHQW·V UHOHDVH RI IXWXUHFODLPV ZLWKRXW D IDFtual
QH[XV WR *RRJOH·V SDVW FRQGXFW $QG HYHQ WKH Authors Guild VHWWOHPHQW LWVHOI ZRXOGQ·W QHFHVVDULO\ EH
precedential in the Two-gle case. Another judge, especially one sitting in another circuit, and armed with
the discretion district judges enjoy in deciding whether to approve class-action settlements, could well
decide to disregard whatever Judge Chin says.
A Two-gle settlement would also need to surmount some new and difficult hurdles of its own. For
one, it would be open to challenge on collusiveness grounds. The Authors Guild lawsuit was genuinely
adversarial when filed,17 the parties did significant pretrial work, and litigation remains a real possibility if
the settlement falls through. But since a structured Two-gle settlement would be the goal ab initio, it would
be difficult to negotiate one without calling into question the adequacy of the class representation or the
existence of an Article III case or controversy. Unless Two-JOH·VVHWWOHPHQWGLIIHUHGIURP*RRJOH·VLQVRPH
material points, it mighWEHKDUGWRVD\WKDWLWZDVDFWXDOO\QHJRWLDWHGDWDUPV·OHQJWK
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed Google Books settlement is exclusive as to orphan works. This exclusivity may or
PD\QRWEHDQDQWLWUXVWSUREOHP,W·VSRVVLEOHWRDUJXH³though I think incorrectly³that making Google
the exclusive seller of unclaimed out-of-print books is automatically superior to having no one selling them.
17

To the point that Paul Aiken of the Authors Guild told the New York Times that an opt-out system for securing copyright
RZQHUV·SHUPLVVLRQV´WXUQHGORQJVWDQGLQJSUHFHGHQWVLQFRS\ULJKWODZXSVLGHGRZQµ(GZDUG:\DWWWriters Sue Google, Accusing
It of Copyright Violation, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005.
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,W·VDOVRSRVVLEOHWRDUJXHWKDWQRQHRIWKHDFWXDOVHWWOHPHQWSURJUDPVSRVHDWKUHDWRIVXSUD-competitive
pricing. Here, I sWLOO GLVDJUHH WKRXJK ZLWK VRPHZKDW OHVV FHUWDLQW\ %XW DV ZH H[DPLQH WKH VHWWOHPHQW·V
HIIHFWV DQG LPSOLFDWLRQV ZH VKRXOGQ·W NLG RXUVHOYHV WKDW LW·V QRQH[FOXVLYH )RU JRRG RU IRU LOO LW JLYHV
Google a unique privilege to sell orphan books.
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